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Abstract: This paper examines how Taiwan moved from being viewed 
as a model Asian democracy to one allegedly suffering from democratic 
reversal. The reasons for the declining domestic and international reputa-
tion of Taiwan’s democracy are discussed. Lastly, some key political 
challenges facing Taiwan’s democracy are outlined. 
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Introduction 
During the late 1990s Taiwan was often touted as a best-case scenario of 
democratization. Despite internal national identity divisions, its authori-
tarian past and the military threat from China, Taiwan went through a 
remarkably smooth and peaceful democratic transition. During the Asian 
values debate in the 1990s Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-hui (Li Deng-
hui) took a clear position on the side of liberal democracy. Taiwan’s first 
change of ruling parties through elections in 2000 was hailed as a historic 
landmark for Chinese democracy and signified that Taiwan was now 
potentially a consolidated democracy.  
Taiwan’s democracy went beyond just conducting free and fair elec-
tions. Compared to other new democracies, it had strong and institution-
alized political parties. Moreover, in the competitive multi-party system 
there was intensive electoral debate over political issues. Content analysis 
of election advertising showed the issue-rich nature of political commu-
nication, and surveys revealed that voters were highly knowledgeable 
about party positions on core issue cleavages (Fell 2005: 18-27). This 
electoral debate did force the government to address key policy areas of 
concern to the general public, such as creating a more equitable welfare 
system, tackling political corruption and working on environmental pro-
tection. Taiwan also maintained its impressive economic performance 
during the transition period, surviving the Asian Financial Crisis of the 
late 1990s relatively unscathed. This explains why a number of scholars 
wrote in the immediate-post-2000 period in glowing terms of the health 
of Taiwan’s democracy (Wong 2004; Fell 2005: 2). Liberal democracy 
seemed to be working in Taiwan.  
This article has two main objectives: First, I examine why Taiwan’s 
democracy has been viewed more critically since its two ruling party 
changes in 2000 and 2008. Second, I discuss the major challenges facing 
Taiwan’s democracy and some potential methods of dealing with them.  
Negative Appraisals after 2000 
The 2000 presidential election was won by the Democratic Progressive 
Party (DPP), a party that had been a legal entity for little more than a 
decade and had only local government experience. In contrast, the losing 
Kuomintang (KMT) (Guomindang) had governed Taiwan since the end 
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of World War II and claimed credit for guiding the island through both 
its economic and political miracles.  
Initially the change in ruling parties was greeted with a wave of op-
timism at home and abroad. However, appraisals of Taiwanese democ-
racy began to grow more negative less than two years into the DPP 
presidency. The island was hit hard by its first economic recession in 
many decades, with negative growth in 2001 and record levels of unem-
ployment. Taiwan also experienced its first taste of divided government, 
with the presidency and executive branch DPP controlled, but the KMT 
maintaining a parliamentary majority. This contributed to frequent legis-
lative gridlock and the perception of poor government performance.  
At the same time that cross-Strait economic ties were booming, the 
political stalemate with China remained as tense as it was under Lee 
Teng-hui (Li Denghui). Inflexibility on both sides of the Taiwan Strait 
meant that cross-Strait talks were not resumed under the DPP. Despite 
Taiwan’s remarkable democratic achievements, it remained as isolated as 
ever, still shut out of the United Nations (UN) and officially only recog-
nized by a handful of countries. Moreover, after the change of ruling 
parties, China continued trying to squeeze Taiwan’s already limited inter-
national space.  
The assassination attempt on the DPP’s presidential candidate Chen 
Shui-bian (Chen Shuibian) on the eve of the 2004 election was a key 
turning point. During the second DPP term (2004-2008), Taiwan suf-
fered from a number of serious political crises that severely undermined 
domestic and international faith in its democracy. A commonly em-
ployed KMT rally slogan in this period was “Democracy is dead in Tai-
wan” (Huang and Su 2004: 1). In the aftermath of the disputed election 
KMT supporters and politicians resorted to using political violence. In 
one particularly infamous case an opposition politician used a campaign 
truck to try to ram through the gates of the Kaohsiung District Court 
(Wu 2004: 3). Political parties also moved towards increasingly polarized 
positions and previously consensual policies became politicized. One 
such instance was the lengthy struggle to gain legislative approval for a 
US arms-procurement package, an issue that had long held cross-party 
support. The delay in passing the arms bill not only served to divide 
Taiwan internally but also damaged Taiwan–US relations. Economically, 
there was a slight recovery after 2003, but the Taiwanese government 
was forced to contend with the widespread perception among its citizens 
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that the economy was declining and causing the island to fall behind its 
Asian rivals.  
However, the most serious crisis that Taiwan’s democracy faced 
during this period was the series of political corruption scandals that 
emerged after 2005. These scandals involved a number of leading DPP 
politicians, including Chen himself. In response, 2006 saw the huge anti-
corruption Red Shirt demonstrations and attempts to impeach Chen. 
These developments, particularly in the DPP’s second term, caused the 
population to lose trust in Taiwan’s democratic institutions: In the 2006 
East Asia Barometer (2009) survey, 41.2 per cent of Taiwanese respon-
dents expressed dissatisfaction with how democracy was working in 
Taiwan. Even more worrying were responses to whether voters trusted 
key democratic actors. Only 31.5 per cent of Taiwanese respondents 
expressed holding trust in the president, 21.6 per cent trusted parliament, 
and an astoundingly low 17.6 per cent trusted political parties.  
The KMT Returns to Power 
The KMT’s landslide victories in the 2008 presidential and parliamentary 
elections brought a return to unified government. Ma Ying-jeou’s (Ma 
Yingjiu) election was greeted with a similar degree of optimism to that 
seen when Chen first won in 2000. In the initial honeymoon period, Ma 
had high public approval rates. Moreover, his election helped to improve 
the reputation of Taiwanese democracy on the Chinese mainland. Tai-
wanese democracy under Lee and Chen was frequently dismissed as a 
joke by the Chinese Communist Party, which also verbally attacked the 
government for its tolerance of the Taiwan independence movement and 
political corruption. Such criticism from the Chinese government has 
been toned down in the new KMT era.  
Ma’s election should not be viewed as a defeat for Taiwan’s inde-
pendence or as a victory for Chinese nationalism. Although Ma’s cam-
paign did call for closer cross-Strait economic ties, this was combined 
with an appeal to Taiwanese identity and an anti-corruption message. 
Ma’s slogan of “No unification, no independence and no war” attempted 
to place the KMT at the moderate centre of Taiwanese politics. Naturally 
Ma’s DPP rivals warned that a KMT victory would mean a return to 
authoritarian-era governance and that the KMT would sell out the coun-
try and move it towards unification with mainland China.  
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The new Ma administration has had the greatest impact on Taiwan’s 
external relations. The term “external relations” refers to both Taiwan’s 
international relations and its cross-Strait relations. For the first time in 
ten years, the semi-official cross-Strait negotiations have resumed, and 
agreements have been reached on a number of economic issues. Particu-
larly notable developments have been the launch of regular flights be-
tween China and Taiwan and significant increases in the numbers of 
Chinese tourists visiting the island. A free trade deal known as the Eco-
nomic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) was signed in June 
2010. It is also hoped that Chinese students may be able to alleviate Tai-
wan’s shortage of university students, and in the longer term optimists 
even talk of a cross-Strait peace agreement. Ma has taken a much more 
low-key approach to Taiwan’s international space, in what the KMT calls 
its new “flexible diplomacy”; for instance, Taiwan has dropped its drive 
for full UN membership and now just campaigns to join certain, special-
ized UN bodies. Another feature is a so-called diplomatic truce, in which 
Taiwan has stopped trying to battle with China for formal diplomatic 
allies. Unlike Chen, Ma’s administration hopes that closer cross-Strait 
relations will pay dividends for Taiwan’s international space. Domesti-
cally, the KMT has been quite conservative compared to the DPP. In 
fact, other than a reorganization of administrative districts, there have 
not been any new domestic reforms of note in the first two years of 
KMT rule.  
Democratic Reversal under the KMT? 
The sense of renewed optimism over the state of Taiwan’s democracy 
that followed the KMT’s return to power in 2008 was short lived. Public 
satisfaction with the performance of President Ma fell even more rapidly 
than that of Chen (TVBS Poll Center 2010). It has tended to hover be-
tween 20 and 30 per cent, reaching an all-time low of 16 per cent in Au-
gust 2009. These are the kind of levels of public approval that Chen had 
for much of his second term. It is not surprising that the DPP has ac-
cused the KMT of reverting to authoritarian governing practices. Such 
claims are more than just sour grapes – Freedom House’s 2010 Freedom 
in the World report downgraded Taiwan’s civil liberties ranking from 1 to 
2. This quote from the report reflects the increasing international con-
cerns over the state of Taiwan’s democracy:  
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In Taiwan, increased government efforts to enforce anticorruption 
laws were marred by flaws in the protection of criminal defendants’ 
rights, and new legislation restricted the political expression of aca-
demics (Puddington 2010: 9).  
Also reflective of this perception of democratic backsliding was US 
Senator Sherrod Brown’s talk of Taiwan’s democracy being “in peril” 
(Lowther 2009: 3). The idea of Taiwan moving away from liberal democ-
racy has been reinforced by a string of remarks made by KMT leaders 
that praised Singapore’s political system as something that Taiwan can 
learn from (Tseng 2008: 8).  
Explaining the New Sense of Pessimism over 
Taiwan’s Democracy 
So how could domestic and international views of Taiwan’s democracy 
take such a negative turn after the optimism that followed Ma’s election? 
A range of domestic and external variables have contributed to this 
change in perception. Like Chen in 2000, Ma’s election campaign created 
unrealistic expectations of change, which meant it was almost inevitable 
that voters would soon become disillusioned. 
Ma’s administration was hit by the global credit crunch. This meant 
that his “6-3-3” election pledge of six per cent economic growth, three 
per cent unemployment and a 30,000 USD per capita income soon be-
came an object of ridicule. In 2009 Taiwan once again suffered from 
negative economic growth, and unemployment reached its highest re-
corded level. There is also a widespread perception that the poverty gap 
is reaching unacceptable levels. It has become commonplace in the 
popular media to hear that Taiwan has become an “M”-shaped society, 
whereby the middle class is disappearing and upward mobility is no lon-
ger possible. It is ironic that while in opposition the KMT had mocked 
the DPP for blaming rising inequality and recession on global economic 
trends, but now that it is in power, the KMT has been using the same 
excuses. Although economic performance is not usually used to judge 
the quality of a democracy, Taiwan’s recent economic problems have 
contributed to its citizens’ growing pessimism over its political system. In 
fact, election results over the last two years suggest that economic voting 
is on the rise, as voters punish incumbents for perceived poor economic 
management.  
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One of the key election tactics the KMT employed to discredit the 
previous DPP regime was to accuse them of ineptitude in governance. 
However, the Ma administration has also suffered from a reputation of 
poor government efficiency, particularly in its handling of the Morakot 
typhoon disaster. It was in the aftermath of this disaster that Ma’s public 
approval rate hit its record low of 16 per cent (TVBS Poll Center 2010). 
A symptom of this dissatisfaction with the government’s performance 
came when Ma finally succumbed to public opinion and reluctantly dis-
missed his first premier and cabinet in autumn 2009 (Wang and Ko 2009: 1). 
A notable feature of the new administration has been an attempt to 
clear up the political corruption cases left over from the DPP era, with a 
large number of former government officials investigated or indicted on 
corruption charges. Naturally the case with greatest media attention was 
the trial of the former president Chen Shui-bian (Chen Shuibian). At the 
first trial, Chen received a life sentence for corruption, money-laundering 
and misuse of state funds. While many of Chen’s former supporters 
accept that he is probably guilty of some of the charges, frequent in-
stances of judicial bias have undermined the legitimacy of the conviction. 
For example, prosecutors frequently leaked confidential information to 
the press, and there was obvious partisan interference in the selection of 
the presiding judge. There are also accusations, both domestically and 
internationally, that the KMT has been engaging in a witch-hunt against 
former DPP government officials. These problems were highlighted in a 
series of open letters to Taiwan’s president and minister of justice, signed 
by respected scholars of Taiwan abroad, that criticized the judicial mal-
practice (Taipei Times 2009: 8). These instances of judicial bias were cen-
tral to Freedom House’s downgrading of Taiwan’s civil liberties scores.  
Another area of concern has been how the new administration handles 
political protests. This was particularly evident in the almost martial law-
style handling of protests against the Chinese envoy Chen Yun-lin (Chen 
Yunlin) in November 2008. In an attempt not to upset their Chinese 
guest, the Taiwanese police forcibly confiscated Republic of China flags 
from protestors and even closed down a record store playing patriotic 
Taiwanese music near Chen’s hotel. In response to the handling of the 
demonstrations, a new, student-led social movement known as the Wild 
Strawberry Student Movement emerged. Its main demand was a reform 
of the parade and assembly law provisions, which mandate police per-
mission for any demonstration (Taiwan Wild Strawberries Movement 
2010).  
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A number of the KMT’s critics have claimed that closer relations 
with China are undermining Taiwan’s democracy. For instance, US 
scholar Richard Kagan writes:  
How can a democratic country be so blind as to seek close relations 
with a government that is one of the most authoritarian societies in 
the world? Who will benefit? Which is the likelier scenario—that 
China will force Taiwan to become less free, or that Taiwan will help 
China become more democratic? (Kagan 2009: 8).  
Whether or not Taiwan’s rapprochement with China and more low-key 
international approach have undermined both support for the govern-
ment and the strength of Taiwan’s democracy is still an open question. It 
is true that Chen Yun-lin’s (Chen Yunlin) visits have incited quite large 
demonstrations; however, most of the initial agreements with China were 
fairly consensual. Public opinion in Taiwan on cross-Strait ties tends to 
be more moderate than that of its elites, thus a backlash is more likely if 
the government attempts to move too radically, for example if mainland 
Chinese labour is allowed to enter Taiwan. We need more empirical evi-
dence in order to draw an accurate conclusion on the relationship be-
tween warmer cross-Strait ties and the quality of Taiwan’s democracy. 
However, it is more likely that the Taiwanese share a sense of disap-
pointment that cross-Strait economic liberalization was not the eco-
nomic panacea that the KMT had promised while in opposition.  
Another factor that has led to questioning the quality of Taiwan’s 
democracy has been the KMT government’s approach towards the me-
dia. Instances of particular concern included police violence against 
journalists during the Chen Yun-lin (Chen Yunlin) visit and government 
interference in Public Television Service, Radio Taiwan International and 
the Central News Agency. For instance, there were reports of the gov-
ernment placing pressure on Radio Taiwan International to stop news 
reports critical of the Chinese Communist Party (Shih 2008: 3). Such 
developments were criticized in reports from Reporters without Borders 
(2008) and Freedom House (2009). In fact, the Freedom of the Press 2009 
report saw Taiwan fall in its world ranking and press-freedom rating 
(Freedom House 2009).  
Looking to the Future: Democratic Challenges 
As we look to the future, Taiwan’s democracy faces a number of critical 
political challenges. How Taiwan deals with these challenges will deter-
  Taiwan’s Democracy 195
 

 
 
mine whether it regains its status as a model Asian liberal democracy or 
moves closer to an authoritarian semi-democracy.  
Reform of the Electoral System 
Taiwan’s constitutional reforms in 2005 established a new electoral sys-
tem which halved the number of legislators from 225 to 113 and re-
placed the old system of mainly multiple-member districts with single-
member districts. The new system was first used in the 2008 legislative 
elections and contributed to the KMT’s landslide victory. The KMT was 
able to win almost three-quarters of the seats with just over 50 per cent 
of the vote; the DPP gained less than a quarter of the seats with almost 
40 per cent of the vote. This is in stark contrast to the relatively propor-
tional distribution of seats to votes under the old system. Another draw-
back of the new electoral system is that it has limited the space for 
smaller parties. While third parties had won 15 to 20 per cent of the seats 
under the old system, they failed to win a single seat in 2008. Though the 
People First Party (PFP) won one seat and the Non-Partisan Solidarity 
Union (NPSU) won three seats, in practice both operate as branches of 
the KMT. For instance, PFP politicians were elected as KMT candidates 
in a number of districts and on its proportional-representation list. Simi-
larly, the NPSU is no more than a loose grouping of politicians allied to 
the KMT, and the KMT chose not to nominate candidates to stand in 
districts contested by the NPSU. Thus Taiwanese voters are restricted in 
their political choices to only two parties. Another lesson of the post-
2000 period was the need for presidential run-off elections where the 
leading candidate failed to gain over 50 per cent of the vote. This kind of 
reform could prevent a recurrence of the limited legitimacy from a presi-
dent elected on less than 40 per cent of the vote. (This was the case 
when the DPP’s Chen had won the presidency in 2000 with only 39 per 
cent, while two rival KMT candidates shared almost 60 per cent.) All 
three electoral system problems have contributed to a sense of political 
disenfranchisement among Taiwanese. Currently the KMT government 
has the ability with its legislative majority to start genuine and necessary 
political reform that could raise the proportionality of the system and 
actually strengthen the legitimacy of Taiwan’s democracy. However, 
whether it has the will to do so is more questionable, as some of these 
constitutional reforms would not only be opposed by China but would 
also curtail the KMT’s own domination.  
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Reviving Political Consensus 
One of the major successes of the Lee Teng-hui (Li Denghui) era was 
not only the ability to achieve radical and progressive political reforms 
but to do so in a gradual and consensual manner. Key manifestations of 
this were the constitutional conventions of 1990 and 1996, which set the 
tone for the constitutional reforms that made Taiwan’s political institu-
tions democratic. The ability to create cross-party consensus was largely 
lost in the era of polarization under the DPP and has not yet been re-
vived under Ma. The KMT’s current, overwhelming parliamentary ma-
jority allows it to ignore the opposition and public opinion. This has 
been particularly apparent in its handling of Taiwan’s controversial rela-
tions with China and has contributed to the sense of political alienation 
in the opposition camp. The KMT should take opposing views into con-
sideration, particularly in the case of policies related to Taiwan’s external 
relations. The first step in this direction would be to establish a cross-
party, consensus-seeking convention to examine cross-Strait and interna-
tional relations. Such a move, if successful, would strengthen the internal 
and external legitimacy of Taiwan’s democracy. Recently we have seen 
mixed signals regarding the KMT’s willingness to consider divergent 
opinions on these issues. Ma’s recent televised debate with the DPP 
chairwoman over the ECFA was a positive move. However, the blocking 
of an opposition-proposed referendum on the ECFA revealed the limits 
of KMT flexibility. Of course the KMT’s current majority allows it to 
continue to ignore dissenting views, but this will only serve to alienate 
the opposition further. 
Getting the Right Balance between Cross-Strait and 
International Relations 
One of the greatest challenges for any Taiwanese government is to find 
the right balance between improving cross-Strait relations and promoting 
Taiwan’s international space. Taiwanese voters expect their government 
to strive for international recognition and dignity. However, if the inter-
national relations are pushed too far, China will perceive it as a move 
towards Taiwanese independence and cross-Strait relations will deterio-
rate. (This is what happened in 1995-1996 when China used missile tests 
off the Taiwan coast to punish Lee Teng-hui (Li Denghui) for his US 
visit.) On the other hand, if cross-Strait relations are prioritized it is pos-
sible that Taiwan’s sovereignty and national security will be threatened. 
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The accusation that Ma’s opponents have consistently made is that Tai-
wan’s compromises to China have not actually brought any tangible 
international benefits to Taiwan and have set the nation on a course 
towards unification with China. Though this accusation may be exagger-
ated, Ma’s regime has downgraded international relations compared to 
cross-Strait relations. This was apparent in a recent survey that found 
only one per cent of voters could actually name the current minister of 
foreign affairs, while the mainland affairs council minister was one of the 
most well-known cabinet members (Zhongguo Shibao 2009).  
While both the Lee and Chen administrations had placed priority on 
international recognition, Ma has argued that cross-Strait agreements can 
help Taiwan expand its international space. For instance, he has stated 
that after signing an ECFA it will be much easier to begin negotiations 
with other states over free trade agreements. However, this linkage has 
recently been denied by Chinese officials.  
After years of cross-Strait stalemates and frequent threats of Chi-
nese military invasion, the recently improved cross-Strait relations have 
brought about a welcome reduction in tensions. However, Ma must 
move cautiously before signing on to more controversial cross-Strait 
agreements, at least shelving such issues until domestic consensus is 
reached. Moreover, Taiwan must not neglect its international space. 
Thus it must ensure that it retains US support and international visibility. 
In short, for Taiwan’s democracy to survive in the long term it needs 
both cordial cross-Strait relations and external support.   
Diversified and Strengthened Party System 
A strong democracy requires a diversified and strong opposition. Tai-
wan’s opposition took a severe beating in 2008 and has taken a long time 
to recover: Under the leadership of the party’s first female chairwoman, 
Tsai Ing-wen (Cai Yingwen), the DPP has gradually revived itself. It 
performed quite well in recent local elections and national by-elections, 
indicating that Taiwan is not moving towards a system dominated by one 
party. The DPP needs to re-create the kind of progressive anti-KMT 
alliance that it established in the 1990s in order to eliminate its reputation 
for corruption left by Chen Shui-bian (Chen Shuibian) and to find new 
political issues to campaign on and win new supporters. However, it 
does not yet look like a party ready to govern again. In other words, Tsai 
has been too cautious in her reforms. The last challenge that the DPP 
must face before it can once again become a viable, competitive party is 
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to find a more realistic set of China policies. Simply opposing China is 
not a feasible policy line for a ruling party in Taiwan. In the 1990s the 
DPP did hold successful China conferences that helped to set party pol-
icy. So far, Tsai has not had the courage to make this kind of move.  
The KMT’s parliamentary dominance means that it needs to reas-
sure voters that it is not trying to revive old authoritarian methods and 
the party state. This requires dealing with some symbolic issues, but the 
KMT has the political strength to remove these relics of martial law. For 
example, the KMT’s party flag is part of the national flag. Of course 
changing the national flag would be too controversial, but the KMT 
could change its party flag. In the most recent local elections there were 
again signs that the KMT was failing to clarify the division between party 
and state. For instance, the KMT directed military police – wearing 
KMT candidate campaign vests and caps – to perform crowd control at 
an opposition march during the 2009 elections (Hsu, Loa, and Mo 2009: 
1). Another symbolic gesture towards authoritarianism under the KMT 
has been the renewed respect paid to former dictator Chiang Kai-shek 
(Jiang Jieshi). Under Chen Shui-bian (Chen Shuibian) the Chiang Kai-
shek Memorial Hall was renamed the Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall. 
After the KMT returned to power, Chen’s attempt at transitional justice 
was reversed.  
There is a high degree of dissatisfaction with the inability of both of 
Taiwan’s leading parties to respond to public opinion. This is apparent in 
the alarmingly low levels of trust the Taiwanese have in political parties. 
Estrangement with mainstream parties is especially strong among 
younger voters. Shelley Rigger notes that:  
young Taiwanese have little interest in the issue cleavages that provide 
the underlying logic for Taiwan’s party system. This means that any 
party which can come up with ideas and strategies that mobilize 
young people has a chance to gain their support (Rigger 2006: 26).  
What Taiwan really needs is more political options in the form of more 
viable political parties. For this to occur, in addition to the reformation 
of the electoral system, political entrepreneurship is needed. In other 
words, political stars are needed to find new cross-cutting issues to cam-
paign on where the main parties have failed. Unfortunately, there are no 
signs of new political forces emerging to benefit from the current public 
dissatisfaction.  
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Tackling Political Corruption and Creating A Fair Judicial 
System 
Two final challenges for Taiwan’s democracy are how to tackle political 
corruption and how to create a fairer judicial system. The corruption 
cases of the Chen Shui-bian (Chen Shuibian) era severely damaged Tai-
wan’s political trust in its democratic institutions along with the interna-
tional reputation of its democracy. Although the Ma regime has moved 
to clear up some of these DPP-era cases, it has been widely criticized for 
failure to follow judicial procedure and fairness. In the 1990s, KMT 
Secretary General Hsu Shui-teh (Xu Shuide) claimed that “the courts 
belong to the KMT” (Taiwan News 2008). Now the KMT is back in 
power, the party needs to promote genuine judicial reform to make sure 
that accusations of judicial bias are no longer justified.  
Also, the KMT needs to clean up its own affairs. The seriousness of 
the corruption problem is evidenced by the series of KMT legislators 
that have had their 2008 elections disqualified due to vote-buying. Simi-
larly, KMT politicians and supporters have dominated the vote-buying 
cases that are under investigation for the 2009 local elections (Huang 
2009). Lastly, the KMT needs to deal with its party assets: This is the 
vast business and property empire that it accumulated under martial law, 
and that which gives the party a massive financial advantage in elections. 
Although the KMT has spoken of resolving its party-assets problem for 
a number of years, the party is still too reliant on these assets for cam-
paign funds. Rather than selectively selling off these controversial assets, 
donating them to the state would be a more positive step in the direction 
of a level electoral playing field.    
Conclusion 
Over the last three decades, Taiwan has gained a reputation for eco-
nomic and political miracles. However, political developments since 
2000 have eroded domestic and international confidence in the island’s 
democracy. In this paper I have tried to explain the recent pessimism 
over its political system. The challenges that I suggest Taiwan’s democ-
racy faces today are a mix of new and old issues. In particular, I pro-
posed that Taiwan needs to revise its electoral system, seek out political 
consensus, get a balance between cross-Strait and international relations, 
strengthen and diversify the party system, and create a fairer judicial 
system. A number of these challenges overlap with those raised by Shel-
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ley Rigger in the late 1990s (Rigger 1998: 178-193). Whether Taiwan is 
able to maintain its status as a “beacon of democracy” will depend on 
how its voters and political elite deal with the key political challenges 
discussed here. Developments in Taiwan in the post-2008 period suggest 
that Taiwan’s political elite are not yet ready to embrace the kind of con-
sensual politics that I have advocated here.  
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